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The problem of evil is a much-debated issue and is as old as human 
history itself. Evil is a universal and the most common experience 
of humans, in the sense it functions as a common denominator and 
no one escapes. Evil causes a sense of isolation. This is evident in 
the lives of theists. Evil isolates humans from God. Evil is also one 
such experience that is personal and existential. Evil brings along a 
lot of meaninglessness. Here it expresses itself as victimization.  
As experiences of evil differ, so too the approaches to it. Many 
attempts have been made – philosophically and theologically – to 
find a satisfactory solution to this problem. Some approach evil as 
an intellectual problem, while for others it is existential. 
Intellectually, the problem of evil is concerned with how to give a 
rational explanation that reconciles the existence of evil with the 
existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and omni benevolent God. 
Existentially, the problem of evil challenges us to console those 
who suffer and to help them to find some sort of meaning in 
tragedies that they encounter. No matter how one approaches it, 
for anyone who reflects on the meaning of life, the problem of evil 
is fundamental and inescapable. 
For our theist ancestors, the problem of evil did not pose a threat to 
the existence of God. They by and large accepted evil as part of 
God‟s plan. Theists offer many solutions to the problem of evil. An 
exhaustive study of each solution is beyond the scope of this paper. 
However, I will make a very brief mention of the most significant 
and historically influential solutions. They are the contrast and the 
nonintervention solution, evil as punishment for sin, evil as test of 
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man‟s faith, evil as God‟s warning, the character building theory, 
this world is the best of all possible worlds even though evil is a 
necessary ingredient of it, the free-will argument and the ultimate 
harmony solution (Madden 1964i). 
As human beings evolved, the understanding of evil too changed. 
Today we live in a world where evil – both material and moralii - 
grows luxuriantly. Many have argued that there is a logical 
inconsistency between the existence of God and of evil (Madden 
1964; Martin 1978). The argument can well be summarized as 
follows: 
a) Evil is something which requires an explanation, and the 
best available explanation include (or entail) that God does 
not exist. 
b) We can directly (immediately, intuitively) see a support 
relationship between the existence of evil and the non-
existence of God. 
c) Our inability to resolve the prima facie conflict between the 
existence of evil and the existence of God is best explained 
by rejecting that God exists. (Pargetter 1976iii, 243). 
The problem of evil has been of concern to theologians of all 
religious traditions. It is not accidental. The question of meaning, 
ultimate meaning, is central to all religious traditions. 
Meaninglessness is one of the greatest threats to religion. As 
mentioned earlier, existential experience of evil makes life 
meaningless.  
Traditional Judeo-Christian apologists too have vehemently 
attempted various ways to come to grips with the problem of evil. 
Among them Dionysius the Areopagite iv deserves special mention. 
As is well known, his ideas have influenced thinkers of both 
philosophy and theology at every age (Coakley 2009; Leclercq 1987; 
Froehlich 1987). There is a plethora of writings on Dionysius and 
his various ideas.  
This paper is not a systematic and thorough study of the ideas of 
Dionysius on the problem of evil. Rather, I will try to pull out those 
arguments from Dionysius‟s discussion on the problem of evil in 
his treatise The Divine Namesv, which will help us to understand the 
 81 
evil of our own time. My reflections are not philosophical, but 
human and existential. In accordance with the task at hand I will 
agree or disagree with Dionysius‟s ideas where necessary.  
In his treatise on The Divine Names (hereafter DN) immediately 
after the completion of his account of God as Goodness, Light, 
Beauty, Love, Ecstasy and Zeal, Dionysius takes up the problem of 
evil. Many scholars find the placement of “this awkward, 
exhaustive, and at first sight somewhat malapropos discussion” 
(Schäfer 2006, 134) on evil baffling. Dionysius‟s discussion occupies 
about one sixth of the whole treatise, and occurs immediately after 
the discussion on the Goodness of God. There are many reasons for 
this bafflement. First, for both Dionysius and the Platonic tradition, 
God is undivided Goodness and is not the source of evil. Second, 
all the other themes in DN, except the problem of evil, are 
interconnected. Third, the treatise of evil in DN is not authentically 
„dionysian‟. It is very similar to Proclus‟s treatise of evilvi. 
Christian Schäfer answers the question of the placement of the 
problem of Evil in DN as follows: 
Its (problem of evil) simultaneous philosophically completely natural 
and yet „theonymically‟ out-of-place discussion (the annoying 
necessity of what is mirrored by Dionysius‟s indirect stylistic 
treatment) reacts to the itch of the age-old trilemma of monistic 
theodicies: how to maintain that (1) there is only one almighty 
Creator of all (DN 720B), that (2) He is Good (cf. DN 716BC, 720B), 
and that (3) evil nevertheless cannot be denied (cf. DN 716B). 
(Emphasis mine) (Schäfer 2006, 135). 
Firstly, the placement of the discussion of evil in DN is seen as a 
philosophically completely natural way of dealing with the age-old 
dilemma: How to reconcile the co-existence of God and evil? “A 
consistent monistic theory of worldly reality that does not want to 
be diminished or endangered by the paradox of evil cries out loud 
for a discussion of the problem (of evil), and all the more in a theo-
ontology that defines the entire world as being God‟s translucent 
Goodness”  (Schäfer 2006, 134). Thus the treatise on evil is an 
unavoidable parenthesis to the discussion of God. 
 




Secondly, it is an annoying necessity. As humans we are faced with 
the problem of evil. “In the realm of being to which we belong as 
earthly beings and which Dionysius accepts to be God‟s creation, 
evil is perceived as a fact” (Schäfer 2006, 134). After listening to a 
well-structured philosophical discourse on the existence of a Good 
God, it is natural and human to raise questions about the 
experience of evil (DN 4 18 716Avii). Thus I believe the placement of 
the treatise on evil that immediately succeeds the discussion on the 
Goodness of God in DN is not an accident, but a well-structured 
philosophical treatment of the topic. 
The bulk of Dionysius‟s treatise on evil concerns the question: Does 
evil really exist? The first reading of DN answers this question in a 
very confusing manner. In some places he says “evil is not a 
being… Nor is it a nonbeing” (DN 4 19 716D). Elsewhere he says 
“hence one must concede that there is something contrary to 
goodness, and that this is evil… Therefore evil is a being” (DN 4 19 
717A). In DN 4 32 732C Dionysius says “we have to assume that 
evil exists as an accident” which is immediately succeeded by 
“given the fact of Providence, how can there be evil?” (DN 4 33 
733A). There are many such passages in DN which seem very 
vague and in opposition to each other. Schäfer points out this 
vagueness as follows: “Evil is not nothing at all nor entirely non-
existent, since as Dionysius observes, it would be futile to beware 
of or to fight against nothing. Yet, we obviously, and with good 
reason, obviate, flee and combat evil… Rather, evil is not 
something in itself; it is not a substance, not a being in its own 
right. One may still ask what that means.” (Emphasis mine) (138).  
But a thorough analysis of Dionysius‟ discussion of evil shows that 
evil is ultimately non-being because for Dionysius all that exists 
comes from the Good. Dionysius puts it as: “All beings, to the 
extent that they exist, are good and come from the Good… That 
which is totally bereft of the Good never had, does not have, never 
shall have, never can have any kind of being at all” (DN 4 20 720B) 
“… For that which totally lacks a share in the Good has neither 
being nor a place in existence” (DN 4 20 720D). The world that 
truly exists is divine and comes from the Good. Ontologically evil 
is not a being, “for if it were, it would not be totally evil” (DN 4 19 
716D), because all that have being come from the Good and 
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essentially is good. Evil is not “a nonbeing, for nothing is 
completely a nonbeing, unless it is said to be in the Good in the 
sense of beyond-being” (DN 4 19 716D). 
Evil as non-being is not an authentically Dionysian concept. His 
treatise on evil “seems to be directly dependent on Proclus‟s 
monograph On the Existence of Evilsviii (Wear 2007, 75), although 
with alterations ix (Perl 2007, 35; Wear 2007, 75). Proclus is very 
philosophical in structuring his arguments. But very often 
Dionysius simply states his views on evil. Dionysius re-arranges, 
simplifies and Christianizes Proclus‟ arguments. It is not a 
comparative study of Proclus and Dionysius. However I will make 
a mention of the verbal and conceptual similarities between the two 
wherever necessary.  
Dionysius agrees with Proclus that evil is ultimately non-being and 
there is nothing inherently/wholly evil. All that exists should have 
something of the Good within it which enables it to exist (DN 4 19 
716C; DN 4 20 720B). “There is nothing entirely or strictly evil (DN 
721A) since total privation is ontologically impossible, and 
whatever is or can be ontologically „addressed,‟ is good at least to a 
minimum measure. Evil cannot „be,‟ nor be thought of, without 
presupposing good…. Evil per se does not exist and has no rightful 
ontological status whatsoever (DN 721B) (Schäfer 2006, 139-40). 
Evil is not in Good either absolutely or at some stage in time, is not 
divine and does not come God (DN 4 21 724A). If evil does not 
have ontological existence then it could not be in any realm of 
beingsx (DN 4 21 721C). Evil is not in angels since as images of God 
they only announce the Good even though the punishment they 
convey may seem evil to us (DN 4 22 724B); not in devils because 
they are not evil by nature. Their evil consists rather in the lack of 
the angelic virtues (DN 4 23 724CD, 725B); not among irrational 
animals who roar or bark because of natural qualities that have 
their own good purposes (DN 4 25 728B); not in nature because evil 
of nature is against nature (DN 4 26 728C); and not in our bodies, 
“for ugliness and disease are an effect in form and a lack of due 
order” (DN 4 27 728CD). Nor do bodies cause evil in souls, for evil 
does not need a body nearby, as seen in the case of demons. In 
minds, souls and bodies evil is a weakness and defect (DN 4 24 
725D, 728A). Matter too is not evilxi because matter “has a share in 




the cosmos, in beauty and form” (DN 4 28 729A). For Dionysius 
“matter is a necessity for the fulfillment of the whole cosmos” (DN 
4 28 729A). But this statement is not supported with any proof or 
argument (Wear 2007, 82). Dionysius agrees that there is no evil in 
the nature of the universe as a whole; rather it exists in particulars. 
Goodness is present in all these things in proportion to their 
capacity to receive it (DN 4 20 717D, 720D). Beings are evil in so far 
as they do not act appropriately to their natural virtues and thus 
are unable to reach their natural state of perfection.  
If evil is not a being and has no positive or ultimate existence, how 
are we to account for the existential human experience of evil? How 
can evil – which has no being (DN 4 34 733C), no substance (DN 4 
31 732C) and “is itself has neither being, goodness, the capacity to 
beget, nor the ability to create things which have being and 
goodness” (DN 4 20 717C) – deprave naturally good being and 
deprive being? (DN 4 19 717AB). Dionysius himself presents this 
dilemma through a fictitious interlocutor: 
How is it that the demons whose origins lie wholly in the Good are 
themselves not shaped like goodness?... What was it made them 
evil? What in fact is evil? Where did it come from? And where is it 
to be found? How it was that Goodness itself willed it to be there? 
… If evil comes from a different cause, what other cause can there 
be for things except the Good? If there is any providence at all how 
can it be that there is evil… And how could anything choose it in 
preference to the Good? (DN 4 18 716AB). 
Dionysius answers these questions by borrowing the privation 
theory of Proclus, who based his arguments on the foundations of 
theory of evil established by Plotinus. Plotinus and Proclus, both 
Neo-Platonists, agree that there can be no absolute evil and evil is 
privation and lack of goodnessxii. “Whenever we face evil, it is not 
due to some positive force or power…, but rather to some 
weakness… The important thing here is that evil is not described as 
a substantial „something‟ or „entity‟ but as a circumstance or a 
coming-to-pass … which is con-extensively due not to the positive 
agency of substances (as are their forces and powers) but on the 
contrary to some weakness, some deficit or incapacity that they 
have” (Schäfer 2006, 142).   
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What is the nature and mode of existence of evil? Dionysius 
describes evil as “a weakness and a deficiency of the Good” (DN 4 
30 732B)xiii . Evil as partial privation of goodness finds its place 
throughout his doctrine of evil. “Evil…is weakness, impotence, a 
deficiency of knowledge, of ceaseless knowledge, of belief, of 
desire, and of activity of the Good (DN 4 35 736A). “Evil is contrary 
to progress, purpose, nature, cause, source, goal, definition, will, 
and substance. It is a defect, a deficiency, a weakness, a 
disproportion, a sin. It is purposeless, ugly, lifeless, mindless, 
unreasonable, imperfect, unfounded, uncaused, indeterminate, 
unborn, inert, powerless, disordered. It is errant, indefinite, dark, 
insubstantial, never in itself possessed of any existence” (DN 4 32 
732D).  
For Proclus “evil is a parasitic entity…which can only survive 
when mixed with things” (Wear 2007, 80) and it exists accidently 
and is without efficient cause and indefinite (Wear 2007, 80). 
Dionysius borrows these ideas. However, evil as a „parasitic entity‟ 
finds its expression only three times in Dionysius. “In DN 732C, 
Dionysius describes evil as „existing by means of something else‟, 
… in DN 720D in reference to the mode of existence of a disease, 
and in DN 728D, where evil has a contingent existence, being 
parasitic even without a body” (Wear 2007, 80). In all the other 
places evil is presented “as a deficiency in a subject‟s ability to 
participate in the Good” (Wear 2007, 80). Although both Proclus 
and Dionysius agree that evil is a deficiency, Dionysius simplifies 
and Christianizes Proclus‟ arguments. “For Proclus, the agent, 
mistaking the Good, acts in such a way that evil becomes 
intermixed with being; evil uses a mistaken understanding of the 
Good as an opportunity to attach itself to being as a parasite. 
Dionysius, on the other hand, attributes evil to an agent‟s inability 
to participate in the Good – hence evil is an insufficient level of 
Good” (Wear 2007, 81).  
God created intelligent creatures with a free will to participate or 
not to participate in God. The lack of participation in God can be 
intentional or unintentional (DN 4 35 736AB). When creatures 
break away from God, they witness no divinization, no life and no 
being which bears any real likeness of God (DN 2 7 645B). Thus 
privation of Good in rational beings is attributed to their 




deviation/move away from what befits them; to their weakness 
regarding their natural activity (DN 4 23 725B). “The natural 
activity of any being is its reversion, its mode of being, of desire for 
God. A thing‟s lack of its proper perfections, which qualifies it as 
evil, is a failure of this desire, and therefore a deficiency of being” 
(Perl 2007, 59-60). Evil has its origin in this “false conversion” 
(Riordan 2008, 137). “Evil is a metaphysical reality of willful self-
deprivation from participation in God” (Kharlamov 2009, 223). 
“The cause for this denial and craving, however, is found in free 
creatures solely, not in the One that confers this freedom to them” 
(Schäfer 2006, 147).  
Thus Dionysius says that demons who draw not only their 
existence but also their life (DN 6 2 856C) and their intelligence 
(DN 7 2 868C) from the Good are evil to the extent they fall short of 
goodness or “by virtue of their inability, as scripture puts it, „to 
hold on to their original source‟” (DN 4 23 725A). They are not evil 
by nature. “The evil in demons lies in opposing a mind shaped by 
goodness” (DN 4 32 733A). For Dionysius, evil in demons is a 
deprivation, an imperfection, a powerlessness and the lack, the 
abandonment and the rejection of the angelic virtues which are 
appropriate to them (DN 4 23 725BC). Demon “stupidly has no idea 
how to obtain what it really wants and indeed does not want it” 
(DN 7 2 868C). “Devils are, thus, not evil with respect to their 
being, but in their failed activity or lack of participation in God” 
(Wear 2007, 83). Devils cannot be evil because evil is impermanent, 
but devils are always in the same condition (DN 4 23 725AB).  
Nature is not evil. “Evil in the domain of nature is against nature, a 
deficiency of what should be there in nature. Thus, there is no evil 
nature, for this is evil to nature. Rather, evil lies in the inability of 
things to reach their natural peak of perfection” (DN 4 26 728C). 
“Evil in minds, in souls, and in bodies is a weakness and a defect in 
the condition of their natural virtues” (DN 4 27 728D). “The evil in 
the soul lies in the activity contrary to reason” (DN 4 32 733A). 
“The evil in the body lies in the renunciation of what is natural” 
(DN 4 32 733A). In short, “Dionysius‟s doctrine of evil as non-being 
must be understood in the light of the principle that any being is in 
virtue of its proper determination or perfections, which are its way 
of being good and therefore its mode of being. Anything is evil, i.e. 
 87 
not good, then, insofar as it lacks the proper goodness which is its 
proper constitutive determination, and to that extent fails to be 
itself and so to be” (Perl 2007, 58). 
As we have already seen, evil cannot be in any realm of being 
because all things that have being “desire for the Beautiful and the 
Good … all their actions are done for what seems to be good…all 
their intentions have the Good as their source and goal (for nothing 
does what it does while looking at the nature of evil)” (DN 4 19 
716C). To put in other words, “the Good must be the source and the 
goal even of what is evil for all things good and bad are for the sake 
of the Good. Even when we do (wrong) we do so out of our 
longing for it since there is no one who deliberately does wrong for 
the sake of wrong” (DN 4 31 732B). Since all beings ultimately 
desire good, evil cannot be a motivating force and cannot be the 
cause of any activity. There is no positive activity that is evil.  
For Dionysius, evil – as non-being, as inactivity, as having no 
substance – is without cause. “The Cause for all good things is one. 
If, however, evil is contrary to the Good, then evil must have 
numerous causes. And it is not principles and powers which 
produce evil but impotence and weakness and an inharmonious 
commingling of discordances” (DN 4 31 732B). “Good comes from 
the one universal Cause, and evil originates in numerous partial 
deficiencies” (DN 4 30 729C). The origin of evil “is due to a defect 
rather than to a capacity” (DN 4 34 733C). Thus Dionysius 
concludes, “Evil exists as an accident” (DN 4 32 7332C).  
Evil does not come from the Good (DN 4 19 716B, 21 724A). If it 
were to come from the Good, it would not be evil. “Fire cannot cool 
us, and likewise the Good cannot produce what is not good” (DN 4 
19 716B). “Nor will evil itself exist if it acts as evil upon itself, and 
unless it does this then evil is not entirely evil but has something of 
the Good within it which enables it to exist at all” (DN 4 19 716 C). 
Dionysius compares evil with disease. “Disease is a disorder and 
yet it does not obliterate everything since if this were to happen the 
disease itself could not exist” (DN 4 20 720C). “Just as a disease, 
which kills its host destroys itself, so too, if a being were completely 
evil, totally devoid of goodness, it would not be an evil being, but 
would simply not be all, and so would be neither evil nor good” 
(Perl 2007, 57).  




Dionysius ends his discussion on evil stressing the fact of 
Providence. How could a providential God permit any degree of 
evil in the universe? He responds that Providence “knows evil 
under the form of good” (DN 4 30 729C) and “even makes good 
use of evil effects to turn these or others to good use individually 
and collectively” (DN 4 33 733B). Evil comes into being “for the 
sake of the Good” (DN 4 31 732C). Therefore, for Dionysius, “the 
Good must be the source and the goal even of what is evil for all 
things good and bad are for the sake of the Good” (DN 4 31 732B). 
“The reality of evil is almost like a barely visible shadow that 
becomes totally transparent in the rays of divine presence” 
(Kharlamov 2009, 224). Here Dionysius adds something extra that 
is not found in Proclus – the concept of free willxiv. “Therefore we 
should ignore the popular notion that Providence will lead us to 
virtue even against our will. Providence does not destroy our 
nature. Indeed its character as Providence is shown by the fact that 
it saves the nature of each individual, so that the free may freely act 
as individual or as groups” (DN 4 33 733B). “This freedom, in its 
highest degree, includes the possibility of the negation of the good” 
(Schäfer 2006, 147). “The concluding comments, and supporting 
scriptural passages, shift the responsibility for evil from God‟s 
providence to human freedom. This may seem to preserve God‟s 
justice … , but the evasive argument is not really supported with 
any discussion of free will itself” (Rorem 1993, 153). 
Another question taken up by Dionysius for discussion is why and 
how beings fail to possess goodness in its fullness. It is here 
Dionysius‟s doctrine of reversion comes into play. It is the natural 
activity of any being. To be is to love God and to desire him. “To be 
is the activity of a being; and therein lies the possibility of evil” 
(Perl 2007, 59). Possessing goodness is not a passive reception but 
needs active co-operation and participation from the part of being. 
In his long parenthesis about the problem of evil, Dionysius holds 
that creation is basically and entirely good and would continue to 
be so provided creatures act positively. “That which we call evil in 
the world is merely a tendency of things toward nothingness” (Rolt 
1920, 20). However there are many who criticize Dionysius for 
explaining away evil and thus fail to see the existential human 
experience of evil. “He is so dazzled with his vision of ultimate 
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Reality that he does not feel with any intensity the partial realities 
of this finite world” (Rolt 1920, 21).  But others consider the 
criticisms of Dionysius positively. For them “any satisfactory 
account of evil must enable us to retain our outrage at it” (Perl 
2007, 64). And so if Dionysius‟ treatment of evil has evoked 
criticism, sparked controversies and initiated further discussions 
that means Dionysius was successful in his endeavor. He made use 
of the philosophy of the time to explain something that is 
important to his religious faith. Can we do the same in our own 
times? 
There is no doubt he offers an intellectually sound treatment of the 
problem but experientially it is hard to understand and accept. 
Given the fact of the existential experience of evil and human 
suffering, it is, humanly speaking, hard to accept that evil is non-
existent. If evil is non-existent, how are we to understand wars that 
have shed blood, the shooting of innocents, rape of the vulnerable, 
killing in the name of faith? The list could go on. If natural 
catastrophes are merely „natural‟, why do they shatter the human 
spirit? Many scientific explanations are given, but how many are 
truly meaningful? As I mentioned at the beginning, down the ages 
attempts have been made to explain evil and the experience of 
suffering, though with little success. If evil is non-existent, why 
did/do humans waste so much energy and time discussing 
something that does not exist? 
The privation theory of evil – evil is a weakness and deficiency of 
Good – is another argument that does not sell that easily. If evil is 
considered as a weakness and deficiency of Good, why did the 
Good God create such a world? Being omnipotent He should have 
created a perfect world. How can one attribute the evil behavior of 
humans to mere weakness? 
The claim that evil, as non-being and as inactivity, has no cause is 
another argument that is highly unsatisfactory. Once again 
philosophically we can explain this position and say that 
“Dionysius‟ inability, or rather refusal, to assign a cause to evil, 
then, marks not the failure but the success of his treatment of the 
problem” (Perl 2007, 63). But for the average human being, evil 
exists, and not as an accident, and so it must have a cause or many 
causes. But the inability to explain those causes is frustrating.  




People have also questioned the concept of free will. Freedom, no 
matter how it has been interpreted/misinterpreted in human 
history, is something everyone likes to have and exercise. But faced 
with harsh experiences of evil, people often ask why “creatures are 
given freedom anyway, if this implies the possibility of evil?” 
(Schäfer 2006, 147).  People have rational answers to this as well. 
“God, the perfect, could not, being perfect, create a world less than 
perfect… A creature capable of deciding and acting on its own 
account is more perfect (and its actions morally and qualitatively 
more worthy) than one that cannot do the same thing freely” 
(Schäfer 2006, 147).  But if given a choice between perfection with 
suffering and happiness without freedom, what will the majority 
choose? I know it is an absurd question, but I believe the majority 
would prefer happiness.  
Despite much criticism, there are many positive aspects in 
Dionysius‟s doctrine of evil that we can accept and appropriate. I 
do not call them perfect solutions to the problem of evil. But surely 
they can help us to attribute meaning to our experience of evil. One 
of the ideas that Dionysius stresses throughout his treatise on evil is 
that there is nothing inherently/wholly evil. „Are human beings 
basically good or evil?‟ has been a topic for discussion in all 
philosophies, especially Chinese philosophy. But for Dionysius,all 
that exists comes from the Good and so is good. No one is born 
evil. I personally believe that one becomes evil in the process. There 
are many factors that contribute to it – social, religious, economical, 
emotional… If one has become evil, all humanity contributes to that 
directly and indirectly. Consider for example the incident that 
shook India as a nation in 2012 – the rape of a young girl in a 
running bus. Having done this inhuman act, the perpetrators 
threwher out of the bus. Within weeks the victim died in a hospital 
in Singapore. Or the ISIS crisis that is unfolding in recent times. 
Those who commit these heinous crimes deserve properly severe 
punishment. Having said that, I am surprised that no one asked the 
question, „what made these people do such an evil act?‟ Ultimately 
they are to be blamed, but „only‟ they? Are those who commit 
inhuman acts born evil? For me the answer is no. Victimizers have 
a past to which many are a part. All have contributed positively or 
negatively, directly or indirectly. In that sense we all bear the 
burden of guilt of every evil act done in the world. Dionysius‟s 
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stand that everything is inherently good should help everyone to 
reflect more on one‟s responsibility towards the other. Even though 
evil in the world saddens us, still we can be agents of hope like 
young Ann Frank who said, “it‟s a wonder I haven‟t abandoned all 
my ideals, they seem so absurd and impractical. Yet I cling to them 
because I still believe, in spite of everything, that people are truly 
good at heart.” She was a victim of World War II and did not 
survive the holocaust, but her words did. 
Dionysius‟s treatment of the concept of Providence is another 
important lesson. Although Providence envelops the universe and 
is available to all, Dionysius stresses the active cooperation and 
participation of being. It is not a passive reception. Beings also have 
to play a positive role in „reversion‟ to reach their natural peak of 
perfection. Providence does not destroy nature or, as Thomas 
Aquinas puts it, “grace does not destroy nature, but perfects it.” No 
one remains evil provided one, out of free will, chooses to love 
God. Thus Dionysius‟s doctrine of evil offers the possibility of 
conversion. 
Finally, evil in the world opens our eyes to the fact that we do not 
perfectly love the Good yet. If all beings actively desire for the 
Good, how can there be evil? The existence of evil points to the fact 
that “the world as we find it does not perfectly love God, the Good, 
the sole end of all love” (Perl 2007, 64).  
All these considerations and lessons,however, make sense to a 
theist. For an atheist, evil in the world still raises many questions 
for which answers are yet to be found. 
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Notes 
                                                          
i In this paper, Madden analyses each of these solutions and concludes 
“that the problem of evil is insoluble and that this insolubility is a 
sufficient reason for not believing in any type of theistic god whatever” 
(481). 
iiThese terms are not sufficient to explain the significant differences with 
clarity (McCloskey 1960, 98). 
iii Pargetter is of the opinion “that the existence of evil is strong evidence 
against the existence of God has not been justified, and …unsuccessful” 
(244-5). 
iv  There are many scholarly speculations about the true identity of 
Dionysius. For a detailed discussion, see Pelikan 1987; Wilberding 1991. 
v  Translations of the writings attached to the name of Dionysius the 
Areopagite are numerous. I have followed the translation edited by 
Farina, John. 1987. Pseudo Dionysius: The Complete Works. Mahwah. Paulist 
Press.   
vi For the most recent discussion on Dionysius‟ philosophical dependence 
on Proclus, see Wear 2007, 75-84. 
vii (DN 4 18 716A) indicates The Divine Names, chapter 4, section 18, and 
column 716A. 
viii This monograph is also called On the Subsistence of Evils (Perl 2007, 53) 
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ix For a detailed study of the influence of Proclus on Dionysius, see Wear 
2007, 75-84). 
x For Proclus,the realm of beings includes “gods, angels, daemons, heroes, 
souls (Immaculate souls, fallen human souls, irrational souls), nature and 
matter” (Wear 2007, 83). Dionysius, as a Christian, appropriates this non-
Christian hierarchy of being excluding gods, and simplifies the whole 
argument stating that since everything proceeds from the Good, evil 
cannot reside at any level of being (Wear 2007, 83). 
xi Plotinus holds “that matter is both evil and a necessary consequence of 
the Good, without which the (good) cosmos could not be produced” (Perl 
2007, 58). Proclus rejected this doctrine (Perl 2007, 56). 
xii For a detailed explanation, please see Perl 2007 and O‟Brien 2006. 
xiii Dionysius extends the privation theory to all realms of beings, from 
angels down to matter. Evil is no positive reality in anything. But it can 
occur at any level of being. Whereas Proclus applies privation theory only 
to the realms of human souls and natural bodies (Perl 2007, 58). 
xiv Dionysius takes this concept from Origen (Wear 2007, 83).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
